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HAIL TO THE CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 
Dennis J. Hutchinson* 
EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE. By G. Edward White. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1982. Pp. x, 429. $25. 
SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT - A JU-
DICIAL BIOGRAPHY. BY Bernard Schwartz. Unabridged edition. 
New York: New York University Press. 1983. Pp. xii, 833. $29.95. 
If a man shall be judged by his foes as well as by his friends, then Earl 
Warren led a charmed life as Chief Justice of the United States. For the 
sixteen years that he occupied the office, Warren benefited from extrava-
gant praise by public figures and friendly scholars, and from condemnation 
by racial bigots, Birchers, and religious zealots. When Warren retired from 
the Supreme Court in 1969 and again when he died five years later, it was 
said that an era had passed with him: a moral epoch, which somehow he 
personified, had ended.1 In the nine years since Warren's death, his ene-
mies and critics have found new targets, but his place in history is now 
jeopardized by some of his best friends - or at least those sympathetic to 
the era and the man who symbolized it. G. Edward White and Bernard 
Schwartz, both of whom must be counted among Warren's friendly critics,2 
have produced book-length studies that focus on the Chief Justice and the 
Court over which he presided. Both books claim to be biographies in the 
traditional sense, but neither is: White has written an extended essay at-
tacking what he sees as the conventional historical stereotype of Warren,3 
and Schwartz has produced a term-by-term narrative, with occasional 
asides, about the Court's deliberations and major constitutional decisions 
between 1953 and 1969. White's book, for all its scrupulous attention to the 
facts and its elegant presentation, reads more like a brief than a biography, 
and a curiously dated brief at that. The issues for White are the issues 
shaped by Warren's severest academic critics in the 1960s. In order to res-
cue Warren post mortem, White resorts to rather slippery definitions of 
• Associate Professor in the College and Associate Professor of Law, The University of 
Chicago. A.B. 1969, Bowdoin College; LL.M. 1974, The University of Texas at Austin; M.A. 
1977, Oxford University. - Ed. 
I. For the most recent expression of this sentiment, see Parrish, Earl Warren and the Amer/• 
can Judicial Tradition, 1982 A.B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 1179. 
2. White was law clerk to Warren during the third year of Warren's retirement, 1971-1972. 
For an earlier appraisal by White of the Warren Court, see G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDI· 
CIAL TRADITION ch. 14 (1976). For an example of Schwartz's early estimate of Warren, see 
Schwartz, "Warren Court"-An Opinion, N.Y. Times, June 30, 1957, (Magazine),reprintedin 
THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 48 (L. Levy ed. 1972). 
3. Cf. p. 5. 
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terms such as conservative, progressive, and jurisprudence. Along the way, 
the reader loses sight of Warren, who is caught in a web of taxonomy. 
Schwartz's book is less pretentious but more revealing. The Warren 
who emerges from Schwartz's year-by-year chronicle did not dominate the 
Court, spiritually or intellectually; he merely presided over it. The selection 
of cases and the assignment of opinions were skillful, but the ideas of the 
Court that set fires in the minds of men and women during the period came 
not from Warren but first from Hugo Black and then quickly, and for the 
balance of Warren's tenure, from William J. Brennan. Schwartz's argu-
ment belies his subtitle: it was "the Brennan Court."4 
I 
Professor White lists three "assumptions" about Warren's public life 
which he seeks to challenge in his book: 
The first is that Warren was a conservative California Politician; I shall 
suggest that neither the term "conservative" nor the term "politician" accu-
rately describes Warren's career as a California public official. The second 
is that Warren underwent a marked change in his attitudes once on the 
Supreme Court. I shall argue that his public life can be seen as of a piece 
and that the surface contradictions in his thought can be seen as manifesta-
tions of a deep commitment to a general set of principles that were consis-
tent in themselves. The third is that Warren was not a legal technician and 
that his jurisprudential views were largely derivative. I shall contend that 
Warren was merely a different kind oflegal technician, unorthodox rather 
than inept, and that his theory of judging, while uniquely his, was not with-
out its own theoretical integrity. [P. 4.] 
The agenda is puzzling. The first two assumptions have little to do with 
Warren's legacy, reputation or importance as Chief Justice of the United 
States. The elected public official and the Chief Justice presumably have 
different roles and responsibilities, so the relevance of the relationship be-
tween the two is not immediately clear. In any event, White devotes his 
most sustained and felt attention to the third assumption, which he seems to 
think stands in the way of Warren's ultimate certification to judicial 
greatness. 
White states that Warren relied for his view of the Constititution not on 
history, text, or precedent, but on an acute ethical sensibility to the human 
consequences of the case at hand: 
Warren's craftsmanship as a jurist was thus of a different order from that 
identified with enlightened judging by proponents of judicial restraint. 
Warren saw his craft as discovering ethical imperatives in a maze of confu-
sion, pursuing those imperatives vigorously and self-confidently, urging 
others to do likewise, and making technical concessions, if necessary, to 
secure support. In believing his concessions on matters of doctrine to be 
"technical," Warren was defining his own role as a craftsman. It was a role 
in which one's sense of where justice lay and one's confidence in the cer-
tainty of finding it were elevated to positions of prominence in constitu-
tional adjudication, and where craftsmanship consisted- of knowing what 
4. Cf. Rodell,It is the Earl Warren Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1966 (Magazine),reprinted 
in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 2, at 137. 
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results best harmonized with the ethical imperative of the Constitution and 
how best to encourage other justices to reach those results. [Pp. 229-30.] 
The craftsmanship of "ethicism," as construed by White, thus has two com-
ponents: (1) an intuitive certitude of what the Constitution should stand for 
in any given case, and (2) a rhetorical capacity to persuade others, at least a 
majority of the Court, to see things the way he did. White realizes that this 
version of craftsmanship verges, to say the least, on the solipsistic. He 
quotes with approval Anthony Lewis' well-known description of Warren as 
"the closest thing the United States has had to a Platonic Guardian,"5 and 
asks: "Is Lewis right in suggesting that the posture of an ethicist is fatally 
dependent on the ethicist's own character?" (p. 359). 
Even if one is ethically cock-sure of the bottom line, the future signifi-
cance of a judicial decision depends largely on how the bottom line is ratio-
nalized. White seems to concede that the second component of Warren's 
craft was often inadequate to the task, and identifies Brennan as "Warren's 
judicial technician. He was capable, in cases such as Baker v. Carr, or New 
York Times v. Sullivan, of supplying doctrinal rationales for decisions in 
which Warren strongly believed" (p. 185). 
Brennan's importance, which emerges more vividly in Schwartz's book, 
goes well beyond what White describes. Not only did Brennan provide the 
theoretical framework for Warren's ethical intuitions, but he did so in a 
way that held together majority opinions that might otherwise have splin-
tered into several precedentially-insignificant voices. In a larger sense, 
Brennan provided a doctrinal coherence - admittedly not accepted by all 
- for what the Court was doing. To the extent that the Court over which 
Warren presided has any intellectual legacy that is accessible to those 
trained in doctrine and not in ethics, it is Brennan who is responsible. 
What did Warren provide other than a handy vote and a symbolic 
figurehead for the legal and social revolution that the Court touched off? 
Perhaps Warren's stature was assured in the minds of many with the deci-
sion during his first term in Brown v. Board of Education. 6 His achieve-
ment, widely praised at the time, was not only in authoring the opinion that 
found state-imposed segregation in public schools unconstitutional, but also 
- almost more important - in pulling together a unanimous Court for the 
result and the opinion.7 For White, Brown is the "crucible" for Earl War-
ren that shaped his role and his vision of his job (ch. 6), and he recounts the 
now familiar story of how unanimity was achieved. 8 
Brown may have been Warren's crucible (White's evidence is very cir-
cumstantial), but it is too much to say that Warren deserves the lion's share 
of responsibility for the unanimity that the justices displayed on May 17, 
5. P. 359, quoting Lewis, Earl Warren, in IV L. FRIEDMAN & F. ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 2721, 
2726 (1969). 
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
7. See generally Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme 
Court, 1948-1958, 68 Geo. L.J. I (1979). 
8. See Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 690 (1971), reprinted in L. 
FRIEDMAN & H. SCHEIBER, AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 343 (1978); Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 34-44. See generally, R. KLUG ER, SIM· 
PLE JUSTICE (1976). 
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1954. I have argued elsewhere in detail that, far from shaping a unanimous 
Court for Brown, Warren inherited a Court that had been largely prepared, 
since 1950, to rule unanimously that segregation in public schools was un-
constitutional.9 In that year, the Court held that state-imposed segregation 
at the college level violated the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. The internal evidence of the Court's deliberations in those 
cases, Sweatt v. Painter 10 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 11 
makes abundantly clear that the justices knew what was coming, knew that 
it would be impossible to rule the other way, and felt that unanimity was an 
extremely valuable tool for securing compliance with the decision. War-
ren's achievement in Brown was to head off a possible dissent by Stanley 
Reed and a threatened co~curring opinion by Robert H. Jackson. The 
achievement is significant, but it is not on the order of achieving the result 
singlehandedly. 
Warren's achievement in Brown was purchased at a high price. The 
sticking point in the Court's deliberations prior to Warren's arrival was not 
so much result as remedy. Chief Justice Vinson, and Justices Reed, Jackson 
and Clark had all expressed anxieties more over implementation than over 
the substantive decision. When Warren became Chief Justice after what 
too many have viewed as Vinson's timely death, he immediately realized 
the problem and solved it in melodramatic fashion: he persuaded the jus-
tices to decide the substantive issue first and to delay decision on the decree 
until later. The tactic worked perfectly, but the divisions over the remedy 
were postponed rather than defused. When the case was reargued a year 
later, it became clear that the remedy was, if anything, an even more bewil-
dering question than it had appeared to be under Vinson. Having been 
unanimous once, the justices felt that they had to be unanimous again or 
risk undermining the moral force of their first decision. Warren again 
wrote for a unanimous Court, but this time unanimity was limited to the 
lowest common denominator among the nine - which produced equivoca-
tion and temporization on every line. To a large extent, then, the unanimity 
Warren helped to consolidate in Brown I boomeranged in Brown IL 12 
Warren's tactics for marshalling the Court in the School Segregation 
Cases deserve only qualified praise even from those who view judicial per-
formance, especially by a Chief Justice, as essentially a function of internal 
administration. Moreover, Warren's behavior with respect to the opinions 
in the segregation cases demonstrate the nature and price of craftsmanship 
based on ethics. In Bolling v. Sharpe, 13 the companion case to Brown from 
the District of Columbia, the first draft of Warren's opinion for the Court 
held that federally-imposed segregation in the District's schools violated the 
fifth amendment, because "[i]t would be unthinkable that the Federal Gov-
ernment should have a lesser duty to protect what, in our present circum-
9. Hutchinson, supra note 7. 
10. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
11. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
12. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
13. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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stances, is a fundamental liberty."14 Warren changed the sentence, and 
thus the entire constitutional basis for the opinion, when Justices Black and 
Frankfurter objected to reliance on the substantive due process jurispru-
dence of the McReynolds era. According to White: "The precise doctrinal 
steps that the Court took to justify the eradication through constitutional 
analysis were far less important to Warren than the Court's reaching the 
result of eradication unequivocally and unanimously" (p. 228). 
Whatever one thinks of the appropriateness of the constitutional analy-
sis assumed by White's observation, neither Warren then, nor White now, 
seem to appreciate fully the costs of Warren's casual attitude toward the 
theoretical content of opinions issued by the Court. "Deeds without doc-
trines," as Robert G. McCloskey one~ called them, 15 are self-defeating. In 
the short run, they leave the Court vulnerable to attack for being willful 
rather than rational; in the long run, they provide an empty legacy to inher-
itors of the faith. Professor Ronald Dworkin, by no means unsympathetic 
to the mission of the Warren Court, criticized Justice Douglas for the same 
failure. 16 
If Douglas's constitutional theories were wishful or transparently fanci-
ful, Warren's were simply empty. "Evolving standards of decency" 17 may 
be a convenient rationalization, but it hardly provides much guidance for 
future cases. And to say that a contrary result would be "unthinkable" only 
invites doubt - at least as a general principle.18 At times, Warren even 
gave away more doctrinally than he might have wished had he looked 
down the road: his contribution to the jurisprudence of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in McGowan v. Mary/and19 has been an annoying obstacle in 
the past decade to those who have tried to carry on the egalitarian revolu-
tion that began during his tenure.20 If one looks to Warren for an enduring 
legacy, as White seems to invite us to do, one finds more symbol than 
substance. 
II 
Unlike White, Schwartz does not get bogged down in theory or in elabo-
rate arguments to rehabilitate Warren's reputation for the ages. Facts, not 
concepts, are Professor Schwartz's meat. He has combed most21 of the 
14. The draft is published in its entirety in Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 93. White's discus-
sion is at pp. 226-28. 
15. McCloskey, Deeds without Doctrines, 56 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 71 (1962), reprinted i11 R. 
MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 221 (1972). 
16. Dworkin, Book Review, NEW YORK REV. OF BOOKS, at Feb. 19, 1981, at 3, 7. 
17. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, IOI (1958). 
18. See generally Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Rea/isl Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 232-34 
(1972). 
19. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See also McDonald v. Board of Election Commrs., 394 U.S. 802 
(1969). 
20. For Justice Brennan's attempts to put some teeth into the McGowan test, see, e.g., Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981); United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 
449 U.S. 166, 182 (1980) (dissenting opinion); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); 
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1975) (dissenting opinion); United States Dept. of 
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
21. It does not appear that Schwartz consulted the working papers of Justice Robert H. 
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available judicial papers for the period (those of Hugo Black, Harold Bur-
ton, Tom Clark, William 0. Douglas, Felix Frankfurter, and John Marshall 
Harlan), interviewed former clerks to Warren, and talked on and off the 
record with all the living justices who sat with Warren except Thurgood 
Marshall. The materials for a rich and sustained portrait are all on the 
table: The result is less a biography of Warren than an annotated set of 
internal minutes for October Terms 1953 through 1968. 
The Chief Justice who emerges from this welter of detail is, however, 
vivid and possessed of a great presence, unlike the bloodless abstraction 
pictured by Professor White. Thus, of the 1956 Term, Schwartz writes: 
In most respects Earl Warren could have been a character out of Sin-
clair Lewis or Sherwood Anderson. Justice Potter Stewart's comments are 
worth requoting: "Warren's great strength was his simple belief in the 
things we now laugh at: motherhood, marriage, family, flag, and the like." 
These, according to Stewart, were the "eternal, rather bromidic, platitudes 
in which he sincerely believed." These were the foundation of Warren's 
jurisprudence, as they were of his way of life. · 
When we add to this Warren's bluff masculine bonhomie, his love of 
sports and the outdoors, and his lack of intellectual interests or pretensions, 
we end up with a typical representative of the middle America of his day. 
Except for one thing - Warren's leadership abilities. As Stewart sees it, 
Warren may not have been an intellectual, but "he had instinctive qualities 
of leadership." [P. 204.] 
Warren, as Schwartz shows, also had a temper that could flare when pro-
voked (p. 336) and a consuming vanity. Schwartz shows Warren reacting 
furiously because he had not been informed that morning coats would be 
worn at a London reception (p. 284); ticking off the American Bar Associa-
tion for "deliberately and trickily contriv[ing] to discredit the Supreme 
Court which I headed" (p. 285); and tongue-lashing a journalist who had 
committed the double sin of painting a favorable picture of Richard M. 
Nixon and an unflattering one of Warren: "You people are persecuting me 
because you know I can't strike back" (p. 337). 
If Warren hated anything more than "persecution" by those who saw 
the world differently than he did, it was Nix.on. Professor Schwartz shows 
that Warren became infuriated at Nix.on during the 1952 Republican Con-
vention, when Nixon publically and privately promised to support Warren 
for President but "betrayed" him by supporting Eisenhower, thus earning 
Warren's enduring contempt- a contempt that Schwartz says was an "al-
most visceral repugnance" (p. 21). Forget the bland and self-effacing War-
ren of his Memoirs, 22 the man who had no unkind words for anyone. 
Warren hated "Tricky Dick - that's what we used to call him," "a crook 
and a thief' (p. 21). According to Schwartz, Warren announced his retire-
ment in 1968 in order to prevent the appointment to the Chief Justiceship 
from going to Nix.on, who he feared would be elected President in the fall. 
Jackson. Jackson served only part of one term with Warren, however, and his papers may 
shed little light on the Chief Justice. 
22. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN (1977). For a perceptive 
essay on Warren and his memoirs, see Powe,Earl Warren: A Partial JJissenl, 56 N.C. L. Rev. 
408 (1978). 
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When the maneuver failed, Warren regretted that he had not simply de-
cided to stay in office.23 The book closes with Warren exulting at the news, 
delivered by Justice Brennan, that the Court had stonewalled Nixon in the 
tapes case.24 A few minutes later, Warren died. 
Warren's place in history depends not on his personality or his choice of 
enemies, but on his performance as Chief Justice of the United States. 
Schwartz views leadership as Warren's most important contribution to the 
Court, and he constantly refers to Warren's leadership and his leadership 
qualities, although the content of the terms rests largely on inference. War-
ren frequently was a necessary fourth vote to bring a controversial case 
before the Court (as in Baker v. Carr,25 where he joined Black, Douglas, 
and Brennan) (p. 411). He kept his clerks watching for the "right" case to 
overrule Betts v. Brady26 (p. 458). He assigned opinions fairly and 
shrewdly, which kept the troops happy (pp. 460-61 ). And he assigned to 
himself opinions that he suspected would generate extensive and unpleas-
ant criticism - such as Brown, Miranda v. Arizona ,21 and Reynolds v. 
Sims28 to spare his associates (and to make his place in history?). 
If Warren was a great leader, it was due in part to good luck: He en-
joyed, from the beginning of October Term 1962 when Arthur Goldberg 
took his seat, the ideological companionship of four other justices who 
could be relied on for the most part, at least until the end, to see the Consti-
tution and the Court's mission the way he did (Black, Douglas, Brennan, 
and first Goldberg, then Fortas). Or as Schwartz puts it: "Even the most 
inspiring general must, however, have the troops who are willing and able 
to follow his lead. Chief Justice Warren received his most capable lieuten-
ant after Sherman Minton resigned in 1956" (p. 204). 
Minton was replaced by William J. Brennan, who was more than War-
ren's "most capable lieutenant." He was Warren's intellectual chief-of-staff 
from the first term in which he sat. Brennan was the man whom Warren 
called on to produce an opinion where the tentative majority was united as 
to result but sharply divided over reasoning. Brennan also did the anony-
mous dirty work of crafting per curiam opinions that were in fact commit-
tee reports in highly controversial cases (Cooper v. Aaron 29 and Alabama v. 
23. "If I had ever known what was going to happen to this country and this Court, I 11e1•er 
would have resigned. They would have had to carry me out of here on a plank-," P. 771. 
24. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
26. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). "Even before the 1961 Term began, the Chiefs new law clerks 
were instructed by one of the prior term's clerks. 'Keep your eyes peeled for a right to counsel 
case. The Chief feels strongly that the Constitution requires a lawyer.' " P. 458. Bells was 
overruled March 18, 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
27. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
28. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
To one interested in Warren, the Gideon case (written by Justice Black) is a good illustra-
tion of his fairness in assigning opinions. He did not take the "big" cases for himself, 
except where, as in the Brown segregation case, he thought it was important that the Court 
speak through the Chief Justice, or, as in Reynolds v. Sims or Miranda v. Arizona, he 
wanted to bear the brunt of the expected criticism. 
P. 460. That may be true, but Schwartz also demonstrates amply throughout the book that 
Warren was not averse to the limelight. 
29. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For other accounts of Brennan's work in the Little Rock school case, 
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United States30 (pp. 463-64) are the most prominent examples), and it was 
Brennan who occasionally supplied the theory in a concurring opinion that 
filled in the gaps left by a bold but incohesive opinion for the Court (his 
opinions in the controversial religion cases, Engel v. Vitale31 and Abington 
School .District v. Schempp,32 stand out as the de facto opinions for the 
Court).33 In addition to writing Cooper v. Aaron, for which he received no 
public credit, Brennan frequently served as Warren's editor before an im-
portant opinion was circulated (as in Miranda v. Arizona (pp. 590-91)) and 
occasionally he even helped the most independent author on the Court, Jus-
tice Douglas. The most startling fact about the genesis of opinions that 
Schwartz catalogues is that Brennan, not Douglas, designed the spectral 
theory of Griswold, which Douglas, in a first draft, had tried to dispose of 
on the basis of freedom of association under the first amendment (pp. 577-
80). Warren thought that the case might be handled on the basis of Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins34 (p. 577). In case after case, Schwartz documents in numb-
ing detail how Brennan would accommodate his own drafts and views in 
order to preserve an opinion of the Court that was tumbling toward a plu-
rality or worse.35 Warren may have given the orders, but it was Brennan 
who put together the General's victories. 
When the public record is added to Schwartz's numerous behind-the-
scenes examples of managing the Court, Brennan emerges clearly as the 
single most important justice of the period. The list of his opinions for the 
Court on constitutional questions reads like a syllabus for any comprehen-
sive study of what is usually referred to as the "Warren Court."36 Under 
see Hutchinson, supra note 7, at 73; Heck, The Socialization of a Freshman Justice: The Early 
Years of Justice Brennan lO PAC. LJ. 707, 723-24 (1979). 
30. 373 U.S. 545 (1963). 
31. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
32. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
33. See McCloskey, Principles, Powers, and Values, in R. MCCLOSKEY, supra note 15, at 
290-321. See generally Heck, Justice Brennan and the Heyday of Warren Court Liberalism, 20 
SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 841 (1980). 
34. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
35. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (pp. 413-14); Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471 (1963) (pp. 456-57); Heart of Atlanta Motor Hotel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964) (pp. 554-55); Katzenbach v. Mcclung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (pp. 554-55); Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (pp. 601-02); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (pp. 640-
41); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Betts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967} {pp. 651-52); Te':1)' v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l 
(1968) (pp. 691-92); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968) 
(pp. 705-06); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (pp. 725-32). 
36. See, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (defendant's right to exculpatory 
materials before trial); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (constitutional standard for 
obscenity); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (justiciability of apportionment); NAACP v. 
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (first amendment protection of civil rights lawyers' solicitation of 
business); Fay v. Noia, 371 U.S. 391 (1963) (habeas corpus); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 
(1963) (free exercise of religion); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (constitu-
tional standard for libel); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (application of fifth amendment 
to states, overruling Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 
U.S. 479 (1965) (federal court intervention into state court proceedings to vindicate constitu-
tional rights); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Congressional power under section 
five of the fourteenth amendment); Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 
U.S. 430 (1968) (expansion of remedy under Brown v. Board of Educ.); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (unconstitutionality of durational residency requirements for welfare). 
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Warren E. Burger and on a different Court, Brennan's impact has been 
reduced dramatically. Nonetheless, he is still capable of stitching together 
majorities, on occasion, that are reminiscent of the old days.37 
III 
Taken together, White and Schwartz have collaborated unwittingly to 
put Warren in his place. Although Warren was an important and 
courageous figure and although he inspired passionate devotion among his 
followers, as the warm tributes in the Harvard Law Review38 movingly at-
test, he was a dull man and a dull judge. His significance has been magni-
fied out of proportion by the enemies he made and by the short-hand by 
which the constitutional revolution over which he presided became known. 
Despite the habit of mind that continues to call it the "Warren Court" and 
the occasional vague encomia that some of his colleagues supplied to con-
firm the myth,39 if any single justice deserves to be identified with the con-
stitutional revolution engineered by the Supreme Court in the last 
generation, it is William J. Brennan and not Earl Warren. 
There are now five biographies of Earl Warren, counting the recent con-
tributions of White and Schwartz.40 None does justice to its subject, al-
though Professor Schwartz does Warren the great courtesy of treating him 
on a human scale and not as larger than life. A critical analysis of the 
Brennan period is needed now, but five biographies of Earl Warren are 
enough. 
Brennan's opinions through 1966 are collected in s. FRIEDMAN, AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM 
(1967). 
37. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 102 S.Ct. 2382 (1982); Weber v. Steelworkers, 443 U.S. 193 
(1979) (Title VII and "affirmative action"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (equal protec• 
tion for women); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (further 
expansion of remedy under Brown v. Board of Educ.); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) 
(personal autonomy); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (procedural due process), 
38. See Brennan, Chief Justice Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1974); Black,An Impression of 
the Late Chief Justice, id at 6; Pollak, The Legacy of Earl Warren, id. at 8; Ely, The C/1ief, id. 
at 11. See also Proceedings in the Supreme Court in Memory of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 421 
U.S. v. (1975). 
39. Schwartz takes his title and epigraph from Brennan: "To those who served with him, 
Earl Warren will always be the Super Chief' (p. vii). See also A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 
(1971); Fortas, Chief Justice Warren: The Enigma of Leadership, 84 YALE L.J, 405 (1975), But 
even Fortas found Warren's importance unquantifiable, indeed almost "occult." Id. at 406. 
See also Powe, supra note 22, at 421 (Warren's "greatness" is "elusive"). 
40. See also L. KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (1967); J, WEAVER, 
WARREN: THE MAN, THE COURT, THE ERA (1967); J, POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE 
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